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Structuring Criminal Codes to Perform 
Their Function 
Paul H. Robinson* 
Almost exactly three years ago, I stood here giving a 
paper for a conference on federal criminal code reform 
sponsored by the Center. My goal was to provide a "top 
ten" list of needed reforms.1 My approach was to suggest 
five lessons that the federal criminal code could learn from 
the Model Penal Code and five lessons that both codes 
could learn.2 It seemed useful at the time, but now it 
leaves me as having already said-in this very location­
most of what I wanted to say about what is good and bad 
about the Model Penal Code. But there was one of those 
items, the tenth, that I could only mention in barest 
outline. So I'm pleased to have the opportunity today to lay 
out in greater detail what I could not say back then about 
the item at the top of my "top ten" list. 
How should a criminal code be structured to best 
perform its functions? A criminal code of today must 
perform two very different functions: 
(1) It must perform the ex ante function of announcing 
the rules of conduct that are to govern the conduct of all 
persons within the code's jurisdiction; and 
(2) it must perform the ex post function of establishing 
* Edna & Ednyfed Williams Professor of Law, Northwestern University. 
1. See Paul H. Robinson, Reforming the Federal Criminal Code: A Top Ten 
List, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 225 (1997). 
2. Part l Characteristics of a "Modem Code": Lessons From the MPC: 1. 
Create a Comprehensive General Part; 2. Provide an Analytic Structure; 3. 
Define Offenses Fully, Using Defined Terms; 4. Create a System for the 
Interpretation of Code Provisions; 5. Adopt a System of Offenses. 
Part Il Reforming the Model Penal Code: 6. Drafting Problems: Fix the 
Revealed Drafting Errors of the M.P.C. (Examples: a. Failure to define the 
distinction among conduct, circumstance, and result elements; b. Confusion in the 
definition of causation requirements); 7. The Disparity Problem: Use More 
Offense Grading Categories; 8. The Rationality Problem: Define a Distributive 
Principle; 9. The Utility of Desert: Avoid Conflicts with the Community's 
Perceptions of Desert; 10. A Functional Form: Segregate the Rules of Conduct and 
the Principles of Adjudication into Distinct Codes. 
2 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:1 
for the participants in the criminal justice process the 
principles by which violations of the rules of conduct are to 
be adjudicated. 
These two functions often are in tension with one 
another. Each calls for a different kind of code, addressed 
to a different audience, with different objectives: 
(1) To be effective ex ante, the rules of conduct must 
be formulated in a way that they will be understood and 
remembered, and which will make them capable of being 
applied in daily life by lay persons with a wide range of 
abilities and from a wide variety of backgrounds. 
Effectiveness in announcing the rules of conduct requires 
simple, clear, and preferably objective rules. 
(2) In contrast, the goal of the principles of 
adjudication-to assess ex post the degree of liability and 
punishment, if any, due for a violation of the rules of 
conduct--often requires nuanced, subjective treatment, 
sometimes at least as nuanced, subjective, and complex as 
our notions of justice (or as complex judgments, the 
demands of whatever punishment theory is relied upon). 
One might be disheartened by this conflict between the 
needs of a code's two functions, for it suggests a criminal 
code condemned to a permanent state of compromise and 
dysfunction. To serve one interest, the code must 
undermine the other. All that a drafter can do is to 
attempt to strike a balance between the competing 
dysfunctions. 
But it turns out that no such compromise or balancing 
is necessary, because, in fact, the doctrines that serve the 
rules-of-conduct function are distinct from those that serve 
the adjudication function. Thus, both functions can be 
maximized by simply identifying and segregating the 
doctrines that serve each, then drafting the doctrines in a 
way that maximizes their respective functions. 
Two CODES 
What does this segregation of doctrines look like? 
What doctrines make up the criminal law's rules of 
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conduct? That is, what aspects of the criminal law are 
essential for a citizen to know if he or she is to know what 
the law commands? What doctrines are not necessary to 
know the law's commands and serve only to tell 
adjudicators whether and how much liability and 
punishment ought to be imposed for a violation of the rules 
of conduct? 
As you will see, answering these questions-making 
the rules-of-conduct/adjudication distinction-requires us 
to pull apart most of our current doctrines. Some aspects of 
offense definitions serve one function, while other aspects 
of offense definitions serve the other. Some aspects of 
defenses serve one function, while other aspects serve the 
other. This intertwining of the two functions only 
illustrates just how oblivious current law is to the 
distinction between rules of conduct and principles of 
adjudication. 
I have published a full working out of this segregation 
of criminal law doctrines. Those who are interested can 
find it in Part III of my book, Structure and Function in 
Criminal Law.3 Let me sketch a few of the basic points. 
RULES OF CONDUCT 
Focusing first on announcing the rules of conduct, 
what doctrines are necessary to describe to citizens the 
conduct that the criminal law forbids, the conduct it 
requires, and the conduct that it permits because of special 
circumstances that otherwise would be forbidden? 
Looking first at offense definitions, the definition of 
forbidden conduct generally is found in the objective 
conduct and circumstance elements of a code's offense 
definitions. The culpability requirements of offense 
definitions typically serve the adjudication function­
telling us whether performance of the forbidden conduct on 
this occasion ought to be punished and, if so, to what 
3. Paul H. Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law (1997) 
[hereinafter Robinson, Structure and Function]. In an earlier form, see Paul H. 
Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 857 (1994). 
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degree. (An important exception to this is the special kind 
of intention requirement contained in inchoate offenses.) 
In serving the adjudication function, the culpability 
requirements are supplemented by the excuse defenses, 
such as insanity, immaturity, involuntary intoxication, and 
mistake as to a justification. The objective result elements 
of offense definitions also serve the adjudication function, 
by establishing the grade of an offense, with greater 
punishment imposed where a forbidden result actually 
comes about than where it does not. (Not everyone agrees 
that this should be the rule, of course, but it is clearly the 
majority rule in the United States.) 
To illustrate these distinctions, the rules of conduct 
forbid engaging in conduct that risks injuring another, that 
is, conduct under certain circumstances (those that would 
create a risk to another person). If a person engages in 
such conduct despite the prohibition, the principles of 
adjudication may hold the person liable if the conduct is 
performed with a culpable state of mind. And culpable 
conduct may be punished even more severely if the harm it 
risked actually occurs. 
The rules of conduct specify not only what conduct is 
prohibited but also what is required. This aspect of the 
rules of conduct is found in the objective requirements of 
the law's duties to act. The principles for adjudicating 
violations of these duties are contained, again, in the 
culpability requirements for these duties and 
supplemented by the excuse defenses. They also include 
the special capacity requirement attached to omission 
liability. 
To illustrate, the rule of conduct requires parents to 
care for children. If parents fail in this duty, the principles 
of adjudication examine whether their failure was 
purposeful, knowing, reckless, or negligent, whether the 
parents were capable of performing their duty, and 
whether their failure nonetheless might be excused. 
Finally, the rules of conduct, to be complete, must tell 
citizens when they are permitted to engage in conduct that 
otherwise is prohibited. This aspect of the rules of conduct 
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is found in the objective requirements of justification 
defenses. For example, the rules of conduct generally 
prohibit engaging in conduct that risks harm to another, 
yet the rules allow such conduct if it is necessary to defend 
against an unjustified attack. 
To summarize, the rules of conduct sought to be 
announced ex ante to the community are contained, for the 
most part, in the conduct and circumstance elements of 
offense definitions, the law's positive duties to act, and the 
(objective aspects of) justification defenses. 
The principles of adjudication-telling participants in 
the criminal justice process how to judge a violation of the 
rules of conduct-are similarly dispersed throughout a 
criminal code's provisions. They are found in the objective 
result elements of offense definitions, most of the 
culpability requirements of offense definitions and duty 
provisions, and the excuse defenses. 
The table at page six summarizes the discussion.4 
MIXING RULES OF CONDUCT WITH PRINCIPLES OF 
ADJUDICATION 
This intertwining of rules of conduct and principles of 
adjudication within a single doctrine creates at least four 
distinct kinds of problems. 
First, the overlay of principles of adjudication 
essentially hides the rules of conduct. Those rules need to 
be made readily available to the general public in a form 
that is easy to understand and apply, not buried under a 
mountain of complex adjudication provisions. If one pulled 
the rules of conduct from under the adjudication provisions, 
the total of all the rules would run only eight to ten pages,5 
rather than the hundreds of pages of most criminal codes. 
Consider the complexities of a code's homicide and 
assault provisions, which typically go on for many pages. 
4. Robinson, Structure and Function, supra note 3, at 139. 
5. See, e.g., id. app. at 211 (the eight-page code of conduct). 
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Rule Articulation 
Function 
Violation Doctrines 
Primary Violations: 
Conduct and circumstance 
elements of offense definitions 
Legal duty requirements for 
omission liability; possession of 
contraband prohibited in 
possession offences 
Secondary Violations: 
Traditionally thought of as: 
D = actus reus 
Liability 
Function 
Culpability Doctrines 
Docttines imputing culpability 
requirements, such as doctrines of 
voluntary intoxication and 
substituted mental elements 
Excuse Doctrines 
Voluntariness requirement, in 
commission offences 
D= mens rea 
Grading 
Function 
Result elements of offence 
definitions 
Docttines imputing aggravated 
culpablity, such as felony 
murder 
Miscellaneous offence 
mitigations and aggravations 
ll!Jil defences 
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Ninety-five percent of those provisions are principles of 
adjudication-defining minimum requirements for liability, 
as well as making grading distinctions of aggravation and 
mitigation. The rule of conduct is simple: Do not engage in 
conduct that risks injury to another. 
Presumably most people know of this legal prohibition 
without having to rely upon the criminal code, but not 
every prohibition and legal duty is so well known. Does the 
criminal law prohibit lying to a traffic cop? Does it require 
a person to return a lost wallet? Does it permit a person to 
shoot a trespasser in one's garage? Frankly, I think we 
have given up on expecting a criminal code to educate the 
public. But this need not be so. A properly constructed 
code could teach the criminal law's commands. Especially 
in a system like ours, which generally rejects an excuse for 
even a reasonable mistake of law, such public education is 
a goal we have a moral obligation to pursue. 
A second problem with mixing rules of conduct and 
principles of adjudication is the conflicting drafting 
approaches the two need: The rules of conduct do best when 
they are simple. In order for the principles of adjudication 
to do their job, they often must be complex. The failure to 
appreciate this conflict between the two can lead to 
improper drafting of one or the other. 
Consider, for example, the complex rules of the self­
defense in Model Penal Code section 3.04. It is nothing but 
silly to think that a citizen really could know, let alone 
remember and apply, such rules. I have studied them for 
twenty years and, if I were attacked tonight, I doubt I could 
apply them, no matter how careful I tried to be. 
A code of conduct might be able to establish a few basic 
ground rules, such as: One can defend only against an 
unjustified attack. One can use only that force necessary 
for defense One can use deadly force only to prevent 
serious bodily injury or worse. More detailed rules might 
be of value as non-binding guidelines for adjudicators, 
which might help increase uniformity in the disposition of 
similar cases, but to provide pages of detailed rules, as 
many American codes do, is only to insure that even the 
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most law-abiding citizen will get no guidance from the code. 
A third problem with failing to distinguish between 
rules of conduct and principles of adjudication is the errors 
in substantive formulation that it induces. Let me 
illustrate with the formulation of justification defenses. 
The most common American formulation is the subjective 
formulation: A person is justified if he "believes" his 
conduct meets the statute's objective criteria for 
justification. 
But giving a justification defense when a person 
"believes" he is justified subsumes the objective rule of 
conduct within the principle-of-adjudication excuse for a 
mistaken justification. The objective justification 
requirements define how and when we want people to act 
in the future; the mistaken-"belief' -in-justification defense 
excuses a person who has violated the rule of conduct 
because the person lacks culpability. By formulating 
justification defenses subjectively, as "belief," the code fails 
to provide a clear rule of conduct. The code tells what 
kinds of mistakes will be excused, but how are people to 
know the rule of conduct? 
Beyond this failure of the code to announce clearly the 
rule of conduct, such subjective formulation also distorts 
the substantive rules themselves. For example, we want to 
allow people to resist the attacker who only mistakenly 
believes he is justified, but we do not want to allow people 
to resist the attacker who is actually, objectively justified. 
How can we make this needed distinction in setting out the 
rule of conduct if the code defines "justified" in subjective 
terms? That terminology makes it difficult, if not a 
practical impossibility, to state accurately the rule of 
conduct. To allow defense against an "unjustified" attack, 
what one would think was the most natural definition, 
gives too narrow a defense, for the actor who only 
mistakenly "believes" he satisfies the rules of conduct is 
'�ustified" under the,. Model Penal Code, and therefore 
lawfully could not be resisted. 
The problem can be solved-the Model Penal Code 
tries to solve part of it in what is probably its most 
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convoluted and unworkable provision, in section 3.11(1)'s 
incomprehensible definition of "unlawful force''6-but why 
create such a problem in the first place? Define 
justifications objectively, as their rule-of-conduct function 
would suggest. That allows a simple rule of conduct: One 
can resist only "unjustified" aggression. 
Further, the Model Penal Code does not even attempt 
to fix the other part of the problem it has created. Its 
subjective approach improperly allows lawful resistance to 
the unknowingly justified aggressor. Because the 
unknowingly justified actor does not ''believe" he is 
justified, his conduct is necessarily "unjustified" (and 
"unlawful" under 3.11(1)) and therefore can lawfully be 
resisted. But clearly we do not want the terrorist to have a 
right to stop the thief whose theft of a backpack containing 
the terrorist's bomb would save the beach goers threatened 
by it.7 
Structure and Function gives a series of examples of 
substantive law errors induced by failing to distinguish 
rules of conduct and principles of adjudication. 
A final problem with mixing the two kinds of doctrines 
in a single code is that it makes impossible an effective 
verdict system. Every acquittal under the current mixed 
system presents a dangerously ambiguous message. 
Consider, for example, the Rodney King case in which a 
video tape showed police officers using what seemed clearly 
to be excessive force in arresting an African-American 
motorist. Their acquittal of all charges in state court might 
6. Section 3.11(1) defines "unlawful force" as: 
[F]orce, including confinement, which is employed without the consent of 
the person against whom it is directed and the employment of which 
constitutes an offense or actionable tort or would constitute such an offense 
or tort except for a defense (such as the absence of intent, negligence, or 
mental capacity; duress; youth; or diplomatic status) not amounting to a 
privilege to use force. Assent constitutes consent, within the meaning of 
this Section, whether or not it is otherwise legally effective, except assent 
to the infliction of death or serious boldly harm. 
Model Penal code§ 3.11(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
7. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, The Bomb Thief and the Theory of 
Justification, 8 Crim. L.F. 387-409 (1997). 
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be interpreted to mean that what the officers did was not a 
violation of the rules of conduct. It might be taken as 
announcing a rule that other officers in the same situation 
in the future would similarly be justified in using the force 
these officers used. If people gave the verdicts that 
interpretation, the acquittals could be disturbing. For 
many Mrican-Americans in Los Angeles, such a message 
was something to be angry about and to riot over. 
On the other hand, one could interpret the acquittal 
differently, as providing an excuse, upon the officer's 
mistaken belief in justification, for conduct that was 
admittedly a violation of the rules of conduct. In other 
words, the acquittal might have been intended to convey 
the message that what was done was wrong, and that other 
officers in a similar situation in the future ought not use 
the force that was used here, but that these officers were 
not going to be held criminally liable for their error because 
of the special circumstances of their violation-presumably 
their claims relating to lack of adequate training, 
ambiguity in existing police department policies, a 
mistaken belief that the arrestee was more dangerous than 
he really was, and the confusion and heat of the preceding 
car chase. 
Notice that these two possible interpretations of the 
acquittals say exactly opposite things about the rule of 
conduct for future cases. Instead of educating and 
reinforcing people's understanding of the criminal law's 
commands, verdicts under the present mixed system create 
ambiguity and confusion, even undermining previously 
unambiguous rules of conduct. 
A system that distinguishes rules of conduct from 
principles of adjudication is equipped to provide 
unambiguous verdicts. A system that distinguishes 
between rule-of-conduct doctrines and principles-of­
adjudication doctrines, like the mistaken justification 
excuse in the Rodney King case, can help rather than hurt 
people's understanding of the rules. Here is how it would 
work: If no rule of conduct is violated, a "No Violation" 
verdict would be returned. If a rule of conduct is violated, 
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but the actor is to be excused, an "Excused Violation" 
verdict would be used, which reinforces the rule against the 
conduct, rather than undercutting it. But such a system is 
not possible without an analogous alteration of the 
underlying code. 
To summarize, a system of two codes-a code of 
conduct and a code of adjudication-could better announce 
the rules of conduct, could allow each code to be drafted in 
a way most effective for its purpose, could avoid the 
substantive errors that combined codes tend to make, and 
would support a verdict system that distinguishes "no 
violations" from "excused violations," an important 
distinction to make because the two verdicts say opposite 
things about whether the conduct in this case violates the 
rules of conduct and would be permitted by others in the 
same situation in the future. 
I do not advocate keeping the code of adjudication from 
the open view of the public. Such attempts at "acoustic 
separation" have in the past come back to haunt the 
criminal justice system by undermining its credibility when 
a hidden practice is ultimately discovered, as it always will 
be in our free society. I do advocate special efforts to 
educate citizens about what the criminal law commands of 
them, a task that becomes feasible with a short and clear 
statement of the law's commands in a separate code of 
conduct. 
